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DISQUIETING DISCRETION: RACE, GEOGRAPHY & THE
COLORADO DEATH PENALTY IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
BY MEG BEARDSLEY, SAM KAMIN, JUSTIN MARCEAU & SCOTT
PHILLIPS†
ABSTRACT
This Article demonstrates through original statistical research that
prosecutors in Colorado were more likely to seek the death penalty
against minority defendants than against white defendants. Moreover,
defendants in Colorado’s Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to
face a death prosecution than defendants elsewhere in the state. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that even when one controls for the differential rates at which different groups commit statutorily death-eligible
murders, non-white defendants and defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial
District were still more likely than others to face a death penalty prosecution. Even when the heinousness of the crime is accounted for, the race
of the accused and the place of the crime are statistically significant predictors of whether prosecutors will seek the death penalty. We discuss
the implications of this disparate impact on the constitutionality of Colorado’s death penalty regime, concluding that the Colorado statute does
not meet the dictates of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH PENALTY IN COLORADO TODAY
The death penalty has taken center stage in Colorado politics in recent years. In the past, debate over capital punishment tended to focus on
moral or theological issues.1 Today, however, the discussion is largely
about the practical application of the death penalty.
A number of facts about Colorado’s death penalty stand out. One
immediate and inescapable initial observation is that the use of the death
penalty is in steep decline in Colorado, to the point that it is now virtually nonexistent. To describe the penalty’s use in Colorado as rare is an
extreme understatement. Since 1967, only one person has been executed
during a period in which more than 8,100 homicides have been committed.2 At present, there are only three men on Colorado’s death row, arising from just two criminal incidents: one man convicted of a multiple
murder of four people that occurred in 19933 and two men convicted of
involvement in a double murder that occurred in 2005.4 All three of these
men are African-American and were very young—under 21 years old—
at the time of the crimes. All are from the same county, and in fact, all
attended the same high school in Aurora, Colorado.5
When Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper issued a temporary
reprieve to Nathan Dunlap in 2014, forestalling indefinitely his execution, the Governor quoted a Colorado judge who had said to him: “[The
death penalty] is simply the result of happenstance, the district attorney’s
choice, the jurisdiction in which the case is filed, perhaps the race or

1. See generally, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 51–57 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., Univ. of Toronto
Press 2008) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 168–197 (Robert Heward,
Wellington St., Strand 1917) (1830); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 88–89,
at 47–48 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 32–34 (G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762),
Hugo Adam Bedau, Capital Punishment, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 148, 148, 167–69 (T.
Regan ed., Random House 1980).
2. Gary Davis was executed in 1997 for a murder he and his wife committed in 1986. See
People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 167 (Colo. 1990). Homicide rates are provided by DisasterCenter.com using data from FBI Annual Crime Reports, which shows 8,117 murders committed in the
years 1967 through 2013. Colorado Crime Rates 1967–2013, DISASTERCENTER.COM,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/cocrime.htm (last visited April 9, 2015).
3. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 733 (Colo. 1999).
4. See People v. Ray, 252 P.3d 1042, 1044 (Colo. 2011); People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969,
970 (Colo. 2010).
5. Ivan Moreno, Personal Stories Grip Lawmakers On Death Penalty, CBS DENVER, (Mar.
17, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/03/17/personal-stories-grip-lawmakers-ondeath-penalty.
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economic circumstance of the defendant.”6 Citing a recent study of the
Colorado death penalty conducted by authors of this Article (the Colorado Narrowing Study),7 the Governor added that, since the time that Dunlap had been sentenced in 1996, “we now have the benefit of information
that exposes an inequitable system.”8
Indeed, we do. This Article demonstrates that the imposition of the
death penalty in Colorado depends to an alarming extent on the race and
geographic location of the defendant. Moreover, we use empirical data
and statistical analysis to definitively rebut the argument that these racial
and geographic disparities within Colorado’s death penalty system are
simply the result of racial or geographic disparities in homicide commission. This study demonstrates that both the race of the defendant and the
geographic location of the crime are statistically significant predictors of
whether a death penalty prosecution will be pursued against a statutorily
eligible defendant. In conjunction with the Colorado Narrowing Study,9
we demonstrate two critical failures in the Colorado death penalty system: (1) the system does not sufficiently narrow the class of deatheligible defendants at the stage of statutory definition;10 and (2) there is a
statistically significant disparity between death prosecutions against
whites and non-whites, and among judicial districts.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments has been construed as imposing a variety of procedural requirements on the lawful imposition of a death sentence.11 Beginning in 1972,
in the groundbreaking Furman v. Georgia12 decision, the Court announced its concern, as a constitutional matter, with arbitrariness in the
death sentencing procedures of the states.13 Although Furman was a plurality decision producing ten separate opinions from the Court’s nine
Justices, Justice Stewart provided perhaps the most memorable summary
of the Court’s reasoning in striking down the death penalty in the United
States; he explained that when the death penalty is imposed on only a
“random handful” of the defendants who are statutorily eligible for the
punishment, then the death penalty is “cruel and unusual in the same way
6. OFFICE OF THE GOV., STATE OF COLO., Exec. Order D2013-006, at 2 (May 22, 2013)
(alteration
in
original)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
available
at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251650380954.
7. Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are
Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1069 (2013). We refer to this study as the Colorado
Narrowing Study.
8. OFFICE OF THE GOV., STATE OF COLO., supra note 6, at 2–3.
9. See Marceau et al., supra note 7.
10. This is the finding of the Colorado Narrowing Study. See id. at 1113; Sam Kamin & Justin
Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1014–16 (2015).
11. For a more thorough summary of the background Eighth Amendment law, see Marceau et
al., supra note 7, at 1075–76.
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
13. See id. at 243–48 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”14 That is, for Justice
Stewart—as well as Justices Douglas and White15—the infrequency with
which the death penalty was imposed was sufficient reason to invalidate
the punishment on constitutional grounds.
Even more relevant for present purposes, the decision to invalidate
the capital punishment systems at issue in Furman rested in large part on
a fear that too much discretion in the hands of prosecutors and juries
would lead to the arbitrary and racially disparate application of the death
penalty. Justice Douglas explicitly linked the constitutional problem of
arbitrariness to the death penalty’s racially disparate application. Douglas
observed, “It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”16 Douglas went on to say that death penalty systems that did not
sufficiently narrow death eligibility through statutory criteria “are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.”17
In short, the Furman Court was concerned that the rarity of death
sentences relative to statutory eligibility raised the specter of racial discrimination.18 In light of the fact that the death penalty in Colorado is
14. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Furman was only a plurality the Court
itself has subsequently grappled with the precedential value of the decision on multiple occasions. A
dissent by Justice Scalia provides a summary of the Court’s subsequent treatment of Furman:
In Furman, we overturned the sentences of two men convicted and sentenced to death in
state courts for murder and one man so convicted and sentenced for rape, under statutes
that gave the jury complete discretion to impose death for those crimes, with no standards
as to the factors it should deem relevant. The brief per curiam gave no reasons for the
Court's decision, other than to say that “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” To uncover the reasons underlying the decision in Furman, one
must turn to the opinions of the five Justices forming the majority, each of whom wrote
separately and none of whom joined any other's opinion. Of these opinions, [Justice Brennan’s and Justice Marshall’s] rested on the broadest possible ground—that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in all circumstances. A third, that of Justice Douglas,
rested on a narrower ground—that the discretionary capital sentencing systems under
which the petitioners had been sentenced were operated in a manner that discriminated
against racial minorities and unpopular groups. The critical opinions, however, in light of
the subsequent development of our jurisprudence, were those of Justices Stewart and
White.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657–58 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
15.
Id. at 254–56 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). See James S.
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (describing the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White as the
controlling holdings in Furman).
16. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 256–57.
18. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1073 n.9 (“Scholars have observed that the Court’s conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman was based in large part on the low
death sentencing ratios—that is, the low percentage of defendants who were eligible for the death
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imposed in only a small fraction of the cases in which it is statutorily
available,19 the next question is whether, as Justice Douglas predicted,
the broad definition of death eligibility has, in fact, created a death penalty system that is tainted by racially disparate application. Previous scholars have suggested that low death sentencing rates can be expected to
produce a death sentencing system that is racially disproportionate.20
This Article provides data and analysis to confirm this hypothesis. Colorado’s death penalty, because it fails to provide a meaningful mechanism
for narrowing in the legislative definition, opens the door to disparate
impact.
In 1986, in a discussion of the role of race in capital jury sentencing,
the United States Supreme Court made an observation that is equally
applicable to exercises of prosecutorial discretion at the death penalty
charging stage. In Turner v. Murray,21 the Court noted that, while issues
of race can theoretically enter into any case, there are exceptional concerns in a death penalty case because of the vast amount of discretion
involved:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice
to operate but remain undetected. . . .
....
. . . [T]he risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an entirely
different order, because the decisions that sentencing jurors must
make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are deciding guilt or innocence.22

penalty that were actually sentenced to death.”); see, e.g., Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The
California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (“The
Court’s determination in Furman that the death penalty was being applied to a ‘random handful’ was
grounded in empirical data concerning death sentence ratios at the time.” (footnote omitted)); id. at
1288 (“In Furman, the Justices’ conclusion that the death penalty was imposed only infrequently
derived from their understanding that only 15–20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible
were being sentenced to death.”); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 415 (1995) (“[T]he class of the death-eligible should not be tremendously greater than, say, five or ten percent of all murderers. What was intolerable at the time of Furman and
what remains intolerable today is that the ratio of death-eligibility to offenses-resulting-in-death is
much closer to ninety-to-one than five or ten-to-one.”).
19. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
20. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1115; see, e.g., Chelsea Creo Sharon, Note, The “Most
Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in
Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 247 n.138 (2011) (“In particular, the
Baldus group’s study of racial discrimination in Georgia, relied upon by the petitioner in McCleskey
v. Kemp, reached this conclusion. The study found that, among cases with nearly universal death
sentencing, there was only a 2% difference between death-sentence rates for black and white defendants with white victims. Among less aggravated cases, where death sentences were imposed
only 41% of the time, this racial variation rose to 26%.”(citation omitted)).
21. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
22. Id. at 35, 38 n.12.
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The same risk of undetected, perhaps even unconscious, racial bias23 is
not restricted to jury decision making; the death penalty charging decisions being made by Colorado prosecutors have a strong racially disparate impact.
II. PRIOR STUDIES ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Furman, numerous
empirical studies have been designed to assess how, and whether, the
race of murder defendants and victims affects the likelihood that a death
sentence will be imposed.24 In 1990, for example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a review of studies of the administration of
23. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact
of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 822
(2012) (“[T]here are compelling reasons to believe that prosecutors unwittingly display implicit
racial bias at a variety of decision points.”).
24. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 140–88 (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE]; David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411,
1421 (2004) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Reflections] (discussing the apparent decline, postFurman, of race-of-defendant discrimination in exercises of prosecutorial discretion); David C.
Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 590 (2002)
[hereinafter Baldus et al., Nebraska Experience]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and
the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1763–64, 1767 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al.,
Findings from Philadelphia] (examining death prosecutions in Philadelphia between 1983 and 1993
and finding that, after controlling for the severity of the crime and the defendant’s criminal background, the rate at which death-eligible black defendants were sentenced to death was 38% higher
than the rate for other eligible defendants; finding also that death sentences were most likely to be
imposed in cases involving black defendants and nonblack victims, and least likely to be imposed in
cases involving nonblack defendants and black victims); David C. Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. &
George Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A
Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 147 (1986) [hereinafter Baldus et al.,
Challenge] (including data from Colorado); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the
Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic
Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637 (2014); Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999, 4 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 13–14 (2004); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet,
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides: 1990–
1999, The Empirical Analysis, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2005); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67
(2002); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1991); John J. Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 1973–2007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4686 Murders to One Execution 1 (June 8,
2013) [hereinafter Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut] (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=john_donohue (analyzing murders in Connecticut from 1973 to 2007); ISAAC UNAH & JOHN CHARLES BOGER, RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 1993–1997, at 2 (2001),
available at http://www.unc.edu/~jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport2001.pdf; see also David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 501, 501 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT] (providing another good overview of the multiple studies documenting the race effect).
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the death penalty in various states to determine whether the race of the
victim and the defendant were affecting capital sentencing.25 The GAO
survey found that 82% of the studies selected as worthy of review had
shown that the race of the victim affected charging or sentencing decisions or both.26 According to GAO’s review, although “legally relevant
variables, such as aggravating circumstances, were influential . . . [they]
did not explain fully the racial disparities researchers found.”27
The GAO’s conclusion is corroborated by research conducted in jurisdictions throughout the country, nearly all of which have documented
strong race-of-victim correlations and some of which have also demonstrated race-of-defendant correlations with death prosecution and sentencing.28 The first comprehensive empirical study of Colorado’s death
penalty was published in 2003 and was authored by Professor Michael
Radelet; the research covered the period from 1859 to 1972.29 In a subsequent article, Professor Radelet, Stephanie Hindson, and Hillary Potter
continued that analysis, considering death penalty prosecutions for
crimes that occurred from 1980 through 1999.30 Radelet, Hindson, and
Potter examined “all cases where the death penalty was imposed, 1972–
2005, and … all cases where the death penalty was sought, 1980–
1999.”31 The data revealed that Colorado death penalty prosecutions
were extremely rare, having been sought only 110 times between 1980
and the end of 1999.32 Radelet, Hindson, and Potter found that:
the odds of [a death prosecution] were much higher for those suspected of killing whites than for those suspected of killing blacks or
Hispanics, and much higher for those suspected of killing white
women than for other homicide suspects in the 110 cases where the
death penalty was sought between 1980 and 1999.33
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON
THE JUDICIARY, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN
OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING]; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988–2000),
at 30–32 (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2000/09/13/
_dp_survey_final.pdf (last visited July 23, 2015) (concluding that, between 1995 and 2000, 48% of
death cases charging white defendants were resolved by plea, while 25% of death cases charging
black defendants were resolved by plea—a 23 percentage point difference).
26. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 25, at 5.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See supra note 24.
29. Michael L. Radelet, Capital Punishment in Colorado: 1859–1972, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
885 (2003).
30. Stephanie Hindson, Hillary Potter & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Gender, Region and
Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980–1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 549 (2006).
31. Id. at 552.
32. Id. at 567.
33. Id. at 553. Hindson, Potter, and Radelet identified Colorado cases in which the death
penalty was sought and compared this “death-prosecuted” pool of murders to the general pool of
homicides in Colorado for the period 1980–1999. These researchers demonstrated that, statistically
speaking, the odds of a death prosecution were greater in cases involving white murder victims
(especially female victims) than in cases involving minority murder victims. Id. at 577–78. “While
non-Hispanic white victims accounted for 54 percent of all homicide victims from 1980 to 1999,
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Our work picks up where the Radelet studies left off. Our analysis
of the race and geographic location of defendants found guilty of the
most serious murders in Colorado involves two steps. First, it is necessary to identify the most aggravated murders—those for which death is a
valid punishment under Colorado’s capital statute.34 This task was taken
up by two of the authors of this article, along with another researcher in
the Colorado Narrowing Study, through an in-depth study of all concluded murder cases that had been filed in the Colorado district courts over a
twelve-year period (January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2010).35 The
Colorado Narrowing Study required the researchers to examine the facts
of each murder case during this period in order to determine which cases
were statutorily eligible for prosecution under the Colorado Death Penalty Statute.36 In particular, the study identified a pool of Colorado aggravated murders in which the death penalty was sought or legally could
have been sought—those cases in which a jury’s finding of first-degree
murder and aggravating factors would have been upheld on appeal.37
These murders are referred to herein as “statutorily death-eligible”—they
are murders for which the death penalty was permitted as a matter of law
under the Colorado first-degree murder and death penalty statutes.38 Having identified the statutorily death-eligible cases, we then compared these
cases to those in which death was actually sought to determine what percentage of statutorily death-eligible cases were actually prosecuted as
such.
Stated differently, the primary purpose of the Colorado Narrowing
Study was to assess whether or not Colorado’s statutory death penalty
scheme fulfills the constitutional task assigned to it by the Supreme
Court in such cases as Furman v. Georgia,39 Gregg v. Georgia,40 and
Zant v. Stevens.41 In those cases the Court repeatedly required the states
they account for 81.8 percent of victims in cases where the death penalty was sought.” Id. at 578
(emphasis omitted). The researchers found that the death penalty was “pursued against those who
kill white women at almost twice the rate as their rate of homicide victimization.” Id. at 577. These
researchers suggested that future efforts should focus on particular characteristics of the murders in
those cases where the death penalty was sought (“death prosecutions”) and those in which prosecutors sought alternative lesser penalties, such as life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 582. The
researchers explained their focus on the victim’s attributes (race, gender, and ethnicity) as follows:
“Because the vast majority of research on the relationship between race and death sentencing conducted over the past three decades has found that death sentencing is correlated with the victim’s
race and ethnicity, and not the defendant’s, we focus herein primarily on victim attributes.” Id. at
552.
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2012).
35. See infra Part III. For additional study parameters, see Marceau, et al., supra note 7, at
1098-1108.
36. See infra Part III. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2012).
37. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1072.
38. We use the phrase “statutorily death-eligible” for precision. Prior scholarship has demonstrated the confusion surrounding the terms “eligibility” and “narrowing” in the death penalty context. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 1002–04.
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
41. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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to establish a statutory basis for narrowing the few cases in which the
death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.42
The Colorado Narrowing Study produced a number of notable findings. First, it showed that over 91% of murders during the study period
either were or could have been prosecuted as first-degree murders.43 Second, and even more significantly, the data showed that in over 90% of all
cases that were or could have been charged as first-degree murder, one or
more aggravating factors was present. That is to say, the study demonstrated that more than nine out of ten first-degree murderers were statutorily death-eligible.44 Finally, because the Supreme Court in Furman had
focused on the risk of disparate treatment that occurs when a death sentence rate is less than 15%–20%,45 the study calculated Colorado’s death
sentencing rate for the period and determined it to be just “3 of 539, or
0.56%.”46
On the basis of these data, the study concluded that Colorado’s statutory sentencing scheme “has failed to produce legislative standards capable of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders.”47 On
the basis of these findings alone— the fact that nearly every murderer in
Colorado could have been charged with first-degree murder and that
nearly every first-degree murderer could have been sentenced to death –
the Colorado Narrowing Study concluded that Colorado’s capital sentencing regime was not meeting its Eighth Amendment obligations.
In response, proponents of the death penalty have asserted that the
findings of the Colorado Narrowing Study are largely irrelevant to the
question of the Colorado capital statute’s constitutionality. Statutory narrowing, they argue, is unnecessary, because the prosecutors themselves
take great care to ensure that the death penalty system in the state oper42. Zant, 462 U.S. at 862–63; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–97; Furman, 408 U.S. at 299–301,
304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Marceau et al, supra note 7 at 1072 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has emphasized that a State’s capital sentencing statute must serve the ‘constitutionally necessary
function . . . [of] circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ such that only
the very worst are eligible for the law’s ultimate punishment.” (alterations in original) (quoting Zant,
462 U.S. at 878)).
43. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1109.
44. Id. at 1110 (finding that in approximately 90% of first-degree murder convictions, a
finding of at least one aggravating factor would have been upheld on appeal).
45. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1283, 1288 (1997) (“In Furman, the Justices' conclusion that the death
penalty was imposed only infrequently derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death.”).
46. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1112. It bears noting that one Colorado District Court
found that, following an extensive review of these results, the prosecution effectively concurred and
had no objection to the court’s reliance on these statistical findings. See People v. Montour, No.
02CR782, at 2 (Douglas County District Court of Colorado May 2, 2013) (“The prosecution found
that the aggravating-factor rate was 88.49%, and the death-sentence rate was 0.57%.”) (on file with
author); id., at 2 n.5 (“The Court will use the defense’s statistics . . . to resolve this motion on the
merits, because the parties’ statistics are similar, and because the prosecution stipulated to the defense’s numbers for purposes of this motion.”).
47. Id. at 1113.
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ates in a fair, rational, and non-arbitrary manner. Illustrative are the
comments of Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney George Brauchler,
who addressed the role of prosecutorial discretion in death prosecutions
during a March 19, 2013 hearing, held before the Colorado General Assembly’s House Committee on the Judiciary on House Bill 13-1264,
which concerned a proposed repeal of Colorado’s death penalty.48 When
asked whether the dearth of defendants on death row—in contrast with
the “thousands” of murder convictions that had been obtained in Colorado—constituted evidence that the death penalty was being imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, Mr. Brauchler responded, “No . . . . In fact, what
it is, it’s the exercise of discretion. . . . [T]he fact that we don’t pursue
[the death penalty] on a greater percentage of murder cases only shows
you the amount of discretion that these District Attorneys exercise in
seeking it.”49 Mr. Brauchler further stated:
It’s false to say that every first degree murder case could arguably be
the death penalty. . . . In fact, it requires more than existence of an
aggravating factor. . . . [O]ne of the hallmarks of a free people and
the best criminal justice system in the country is something that’s
called prosecutorial discretion. And it is because we have 22 separately-elected District Attorneys throughout this state, by the populations, over which they will impose laws of this State. 50

The fact that the death penalty was frequently available but rarely used
was, in Brauchler’s view, a demonstration of the success of Colorado’s
death penalty system rather than evidence of its infirmity. Brauchler reasoned that although there was a great disparity between those eligible for
the penalty and those who receive it, this was evidence merely of the
careful use of discretion by the state’s prosecuting attorneys.
At the same legislative hearing, some attempted to excuse the racially disparate operation of Colorado’s death penalty by noting that nonwhites commit more of the violent crime in our state and that, as a result,
“African American[s] tend to be just easier to convict.”51 Fourth Judicial
District Attorney Dan May explained that the racial disparities in the
capital punishment system are all “outside of the criminal justice area”
because “when you really look at how many people commit robberies,
how many are in prison, how many commit murders, how many in prison, they parallel quite a bit.”52 The debate about Colorado’s death penalty, then, has been shaped by an intuition—often explicit—that racial mi48. Proposal of Repeal of the Death Penalty: Hearing on H.B.13–1264 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th Reg. Sess. 260–61 (Colo. 2013) (statement of George Brauchler, Dist.
Att’y, 18th Judicial District).
49. Id. at 260–61.
50. Id. at 248–49.
51. Id., at 302 (question posed by Rep. Jovan Melton, discussing race and the death penalty
with Dan May, Dist. Att'y, 4th Judicial District). See also id. at 273-274 (discussion with George
Brauchler, Dist. Att'y, 18th Judicial District).
52. Id. at 303 (testimony of Dan May, Dist. Att’y, 4th Judicial District).
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norities commit more (and more heinous) offenses than their white counterparts. In this Article we examine whether the “more” and “worse”
arguments that have been advanced by legislators and district attorneys
can account for the impact of race and geographic location on the administration of the Colorado death penalty.
At the outset, it is important to note that there are insurmountable
constitutional problems with a capital sentencing regime that leaves to
prosecutors the task of ensuring a non-arbitrary, Eighth Amendmentcompliant death penalty regime.53 Prosecutorial discretion alone can never satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirements of statutory narrowing—
that narrowing must be done by statute, either in the definition of firstdegree murder or in the enumeration of statutory aggravating factors.54
That is, no matter how carefully prosecutors exercise their discretion
about when to seek the death penalty, their exercise of discretion cannot
substitute for the legislative narrowing required by the Constitution or
save an otherwise unconstitutional capital statute. But this Article sets
that larger constitutional issue to the side. Assuming arguendo that prosecutorial discretion could cure the problem of arbitrariness suggested by
the Colorado Narrowing Study (and it cannot), this Article seeks to examine the data and expose the realities of prosecutorial discretion in Colorado. This Article examines the results of the broad discretion afforded
prosecutors under Colorado’s capital statute.
If prosecutors were, in fact, using their discretion to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, one would expect that only the
most heinous murderers would face death penalty prosecution. One
would also expect that neither race nor geography would be statistically
relevant predictors of whether a death sentence is sought. Such care and
thoughtfulness is certainly consistent with the narrative provided by
prosecutors in Colorado. Repeatedly, prosecutors have claimed that the
vast discretion afforded to them under Colorado’s sentencing statue is a
force of good—that discretion ensures that only the worst are sentenced
to death.55 A careful study of the data, however, reveals a very different
picture. The severity of the defendant’s crime is not the most important
factor in determining whether someone will be sentenced to death in
Colorado. Instead, as this Article’s original statistical research demonstrates, prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty against
minority defendants than against white defendants. Moreover, defendants
in Colorado’s Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to face a
53. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 992–94.
54. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983); Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at
993–94.
55. See, e.g., George Brauchler, Death Penalty Is a Tool of Justice, DENVER POST, March 31,
2013, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_22895409/death-penalty-is-tool-justice (“[O]ur elected
prosecutors prudently exercise discretion as to which few murder cases truly warrant the pursuit of
the death penalty.”); supra note 48–52 and accompanying text.

File: v.4.docx

442

Created on: 8/3/2015 1:34:00 PM

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 8/3/2015 1:36:00 PM

[Vol. 92:4

death prosecution than defendants across the remainder of the state. Our
look at the data shows that even if we control for the differential rates at
which different groups commit statutorily death-eligible murders, nonwhite defendants and defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District are
more likely than others to face a death penalty prosecution.56
III. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
The Colorado Narrowing Study analyzed hundreds of murder convictions obtained during a twelve-year time period.57 From this extensive
data pool, the Colorado Narrowing Study identified 524 cases which,
based on their specific facts, could have been prosecuted as death penalty
cases under the Colorado Death Penalty Statute based on a first-degree
murder finding and the factual existence of one or more statutory aggravating factors58 but in which the death penalty was not actually sought.59
In addition to the 524 statutorily death-eligible cases in which the prosecution exercised its discretion and did not seek the death penalty, there
were 22 cases in which the death penalty was actually sought by the
prosecution during the twelve-year period of the Colorado Narrowing
Study (death prosecutions).60 These 22 death prosecutions, when added
56. See infra Part IV.
57. For a detailed description of the methodology, see Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1098–
1108. The requirement for a conviction ensures that cases are not utilized in which the defendant
was actually innocent. This requirement, dubbed the “controlling fact finder” rule, is standard practice in empirical murder studies. The exclusion of cases under the controlling fact finder rule, like
the requirement that the death prosecution not be legally barred, best prevents misattribution of a
non-death penalty outcome to mere prosecutorial discretion or the possibility that the case was
simply a factually weak one. See David Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological
Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 153, 165–66 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds.,
2009). Such a case is
properly excluded from any analysis of death sentencing outcomes. However, if on the
basis of credible evidence, the prosecution viewed such a case as death-eligible, as evidenced by the advancement of the case to trial with the government seeking a death sentence, it would be appropriate to include the case in the sample of death-eligible cases
that is used to model prosecutorial decision making.
Id. at 166. In other words, a prosecutor’s decision to seek death tells us something about the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, even when the defendant was factually innocent or even when the
prosecution was later barred on legal grounds.
58. Once a first-degree murder prosecution is commenced, the only additional requirement
placed upon the prosecution to trigger a death penalty prosecution is the filing of a Notice of Intent
and filing of a Notice of Statutory Aggravating Factors. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(3)(a)
(2012); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b). The statute includes a list of seventeen aggravating factors that
may be alleged, and an allegation of any one of them is sufficient to commence the death penalty
prosecution. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(5) (2012). A death sentence may not be imposed
unless a unanimous jury (or a judge if jury is waived) finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least
one of the aggravating factors was present. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I). This finding is necessary, but
not alone sufficient, for imposition of a death penalty. See id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(II)–(III).
59.
See Marceau et al., supra 7, at note 195.
60. The death-prosecuted cases are catalogued in Appendix I below. Seventeen of these
twenty-two death prosecutions resulted in a first-degree murder conviction. In five cases (Jimenez,
Wilkinson, Sweeney, Melina, and Perez), the defendants were acquitted at trial of the first-degree
murder charge. See Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1101 n.163. In two of the remaining seventeen
cases (Vasquez and Hagos), the death penalty was legally barred after the prosecution filed its notice
of intent to seek death. See id. at 1105 n.179. As Baldus explained, such cases are useful indicators
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to the 524 cases in which death was not sought, form a larger pool of 546
statutorily death-eligible murders that either were prosecuted for death at
the outset of the case, or could have been under the Colorado statute.
These 546 cases are the focus of this Article.61
By taking a closer look at the pool of offenders who, under the Colorado statute, are statutorily eligible for a death penalty prosecution, we
are able for the first time to make comparisons between the demographics of the large number of statutorily death-eligible Colorado
murders and the much smaller number of killings actually selected for
death penalty prosecution. As will be seen, this descriptive comparison
reveals disturbing disparities in the operation of the Colorado death penalty system. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to identify or
isolate the causes of this disparity,62 which is left for future research, the
existence of such disparity is undeniable.
IV. THE COLORADO DEATH PENALTY: RARE AND UNFAIR
A. Race, Place, and the Disparate Use of Discretion
As previously noted, all three inmates on Colorado’s death row are
African-Americans convicted in the Eighteenth Judicial District (the
of prosecutorial discretion occurring at the outset of the case, even if they are not as useful in explaining system outcomes. See David Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological
Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 153, 165–66 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds.,
2009). Because the Colorado Narrowing Study focused on constitutional “narrowing,” it excludes all
seven of these death prosecutions. See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1110 (reporting “539
cases in which we found one or more aggravating factors, including the death-noticed cases for
which the prosecution actually sought (and was legally permitted to seek) the death penalty”). This
was an extremely conservative approach that would tend to ultimately favor a finding that the statute
was constitutional, by not “penalizing” the system for failing to produce death sentences in cases in
which the defendants were actually innocent or the death prosecution legally barred. Even with this
conservative approach, the Colorado Narrowing Study conclusively demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the Colorado Death Penalty Statute. See id. at 1113.
61. An alternative approach is to include only the seventeen death prosecutions that resulted
in first-degree murder convictions, because in each of the 524 statutorily death-eligible cases in
which death was not sought, the defendant was actually convicted of first-degree murder. At first
blush, this methodology appears to offer the elegance of comparing two sets of convicted murder
cases, rather than comparing one set of convicted murders (the 524 non-death prosecuted cases) and
another set of murder cases that includes both convicted and acquitted defendants (the set of twentytwo death prosecutions, including the five death-prosecuted “acquittal” cases). The problem with the
alternative approach is that it underreports the cases in which a prosecutor exercised her discretion to
seek death. Because ultimately our goal was to examine the impact of prosecutorial decision making
at the very early stages of the process and to evaluate the race and place effect of prosecutorial
discretion, we opted for the inclusive approach (using all twenty-two death prosecutions). Inclusion
of all twenty-two death prosecutions is warranted when our focus is on prosecutorial charging decisions. When reporting on system outcomes, we appropriately take into account the five acquittals
and the two legally barred cases. It is nonetheless important to note that the substantive findings are
the same under either approach.
62. We recognize that such disparities might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to
explicit showings of racial discrimination. “Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes,” and “they can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s
avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.” Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).
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Eighteenth Judicial District is comprised of four counties: Arapahoe,
Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln). This fact makes a discussion of race and
place inescapable. Indeed, if we are to have a real discussion about the
death penalty in Colorado in the twenty-first century, then it is important
to know whether prosecutorial discretion contributed to such an unusual
and disquieting pattern of death sentencing. To investigate, we use conventional statistical methods to examine the relationship between race,
place, and the decision to seek death in Colorado between 1999 and
2010.
Focusing initially on place, Table 1: Panel A reveals that prosecutors sought death against 11.7% of the death-eligible defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District, while prosecutors in the state’s remaining
judicial districts sought death against only 3.1% of the death-eligible
defendants.63 Put simply, statutorily death eligible defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District were nearly four times more likely to face
death than were similar defendants elsewhere.
Race also matters.64 Table 1: Panel B demonstrates that prosecutors
throughout Colorado sought death against 5.6% of eligible minority defendants (20/358), compared to just 1.1% of eligible white defendants
(2/188).65 Thus, Colorado prosecutors were about five times more likely
to seek death against minority defendants than they were to seek it
against whites. Disaggregating minority defendants into distinct
race/ethnic groups in Panel C shows that each group was treated more
punitively than white defendants: prosecutors sought death against 4.8%
(7/146) of eligible black defendants, 5.8% (11/190) of eligible Latino
defendants, and 9.1% (2/22) of eligible “other” defendants (Asian and
Native American).66
Given the independent effects of place and race, we also examined
potential interaction effects: are there particularly pronounced disparities
among certain groups in certain places? Table 1: Panel D provides an
affirmative answer: from among statutorily death eligible defendants,
prosecutors sought death against 15.9% of minority defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District (7/44), compared to 4.1% of minority defendants outside the Eighteenth Judicial District (13/314), 1.2% of white
defendants outside the Eighteenth Judicial District (2/172), and 0% of
white defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District (0/16). Table 1: Panel E demonstrates that prosecutors outside the Eighteenth Judicial Dis63. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01. Statewide, prosecutors sought the
death penalty for 4.0% (22/546) of the statutorily death-eligible murders. See Table 1: Panel A.
64. We use the term “minorities” to describe both racial and ethnic minorities and the term
“whites” to describe non-Hispanic whites. We use the term “race” to connote both racial and ethnic
minorities.
65. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01.
66. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .05. “Other” defendants are not included
in the test of statistical significance because the expected cell count is too small.
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trict were about four times more likely to seek death against minority
defendants than against white defendants (4.1% versus 1.1%), and strikingly, prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judicial District were about fourteen
times more likely to seek death against minority defendants than against
white defendants (15.9% versus 1.1%).67 The disparities found at the
intersection of place and race suggest that prosecutorial discretion is not
a reliable force for ensuring the even-handed administration of the death
penalty in Colorado.
Table 1. Place, Race, and the Distribution of Possible and Actual Death Prosecutions
Panel A. Place
Potential Death Prosecutions
Actual Death Prosecutions
Likelihood of
Actual Death
Number
Percentage of
Number
Percentage of
Prosecution
Statewide Total
Statewide Total
18th Judicial
60
11%
7
32%
11.7%
District
All Other Judicial
486
89%
15
68%
3.1%
Districts
Total
546
22
Panel B. Race

Minority
White
Total

Potential Death Prosecutions
Number
Percentage of
Statewide Total
358
66%
188
34%
546

Panel C. Race Disaggregated
White
188
African American
146
Latino
190
Other (Asian,
22
Native American)
Total

34%
27%
35%
4%

546

Panel D. The Intersection of Place and Race
Potential Death Prosecutions
Number
Percentage of
Statewide Total
Minority in 18th
44
8%
JD
Minority Outside
314
58%
18th JD
White Outside
172
31%
18th JD
White in 18th JD
16
3%
Total
546

67.

Actual Death Prosecutions
Number
Percentage of
Statewide Total
20
91%
2
9%
22

2
7
11
2

9%
32%
50%
9%

Likelihood of
Actual Death
Prosecution
5.6%
1.1%

1.1%
4.8%
5.8%
9.1%

22

Actual Death Prosecutions
Number
Percentage of
Statewide Total
7
32%

Likelihood of
Actual Death
Prosecution
15.9%

13

59%

4.1%

2

9%

1.2%

0
22

0%

0%

The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01.
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Panel E. The Intersection of Place and Race – White Defendants Statewide as a Baseline
Potential Death Prosecutions
Actual Death Prosecutions Likelihood of
Actual Death
Number
Percentage of
Number
Percentage of
Prosecution
Statewide Total
Statewide Total
Minority in 18th
44
8%
7
32%
15.9%
JD
Minority Outside
314
58%
13
59%
4.1%
18th JD
White Statewide
188
34%
2
9%
1.1%
Total
546
22

B. Exploring Legitimate Explanations
1. The “More” Argument
According to some prosecutors, minorities are more likely to face
death in Colorado because they commit more murders, or worse murders,
than whites.68 The question of “more”—if more is interpreted to mean
raw numbers—is the wrong question, however. The correct question is
one of proportions: Did prosecutors pursue death disproportionately
against minority defendants? To avoid confusion, we examine both raw
numbers and proportions. As Table 1: Panel B demonstrates, minorities
were convicted of more statutorily death-eligible murders than whites:
358 versus 188. But the raw numbers do not tell the entire story. Given
the fact that minorities were convicted of 66% of the death-eligible murders (358/546), and whites were convicted of 34% of the death-eligible
murders (188/546), one would expect the distribution of death prosecutions to be roughly similar if the system were colorblind. Yet, 91%
(20/22) of the death prosecutions were brought against minority defendants while only 9% (2/22) of the death prosecutions were brought against
white defendants.69 The same logic holds true for place in Table 1: Panel
A. The Eighteenth Judicial District had far fewer statutorily death eligible cases (60/546) and fewer actual death prosecutions (7/22) than the
rest of the state. Yet, the Eighteenth Judicial District accounted for a disproportionate share of death prosecutions: the Eighteenth Judicial District
was the site of 11% of the potential death prosecutions70 but 32% of the
actual death prosecutions.71 As previously mentioned, the Eighteenth
68. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
69. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01.
70. In the Eighteenth Judicial District, there were seven death prosecutions and fifty-three
statutorily death-eligible murder convictions that were not prosecuted for the death penalty. Six of
the seven death prosecutions resulted in a first-degree murder conviction; if only convictions are
used in both the numerator and denominator, the result is essentially the same (59/541 = 10.9%).
71. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01. There were seven death prosecutions
in the Eighteenth Judicial District during the study period, out of a total of twenty-two statewide
death prosecutions. However, only six of the seven Eighteenth Judicial District death prosecutions,
and eleven of the fifteen death prosecutions across the remainder of the state, resulted in a conviction
for first-degree murder. Thus, the Eighteenth Judicial District was responsible for six of the seventeen statewide death prosecutions that resulted in a conviction, i.e., 35%.
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Judicial District was also the site of 100% of the state’s death sentences.72
2. The “Worse” Argument
Evaluating the “worse” argument—that the death penalty is used
disproportionately against certain groups because those groups commit
worse crimes—requires a different approach. To begin, we must determine which murders are the “worst.” Prior studies have used different
metrics of heinousness, such as the number of statutory aggravators present in each case, or non-statutory factors that evince heinousness, or
determining whether the victim was tortured prior to death.73 We use an
approach that is both simple and objective: in each case we inquire
whether the defendant killed multiple victims—defined as killing multiple victims in a single criminal incident or killing multiple victims across
multiple criminal incidents. Using multiple killings as a proxy for the
worst murders is particularly relevant because each inmate currently on
Colorado’s death row is linked to more than one death—suggesting that
prosecutors and juries agree that multiple killings are indicative of the
worst of the worst. Moreover, as a general matter, it seems incontestable
that killing more than one person is worse than killing just one person.74
Focusing on place, the data indicate that 22% of the death-eligible
defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District killed multiple victims,
compared to 12% of the defendants across the rest of the state.75So by
this metric, killings in the Eighteenth Judicial District were in fact worse
than those committed elsewhere. And not surprisingly, statewide, prosecutors were more apt to seek death against defendants who killed multiple victims than a single victim—10% versus 3%.76
But this empirical pattern also raises a key question: Does the higher concentration of especially heinous murders in the Eighteenth Judicial
72. One might wonder whether the disproportionate pursuit of death in the Eighteenth Judicial
District is a response to disproportionate violence. But the data suggest that the Eighteenth Judicial
District is not exceptional. From 1999 to 2008, the Eighteenth Judicial District comprised 16% to
18% of the state population compared to 13% of the murder victims in statutorily death-eligible
cases in which a conviction entered. See Historical Census Population, COLO. DEP’T OF LOCAL
AFFAIRS, https://dola.colorado.gov/demog_webapps/hcpParameters.jsf (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
In this calculation, we focus on the period from 1999 to 2008 because we had a sufficiently robust
data set for those years.
73. See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment: The Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131, 147–48 (2012) [hereinafter Phillips, Continued
Racial Disparities]; Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 807, 824–26 (2008) [hereinafter Phillips, Racial Disparities]; Donohue, Capital
Punishment in Connecticut, supra note 24, at 11.
74. We were precluded from using other methods, such as counting the total number of aggravating factors in a case, because the prior research—the Colorado Narrowing Study—did not
analyze how many aggravating factors were present in each case, but rather it considered whether
any aggravating factor was present in each case.
75. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .05.
76. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01.
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District explain the geographical disparity identified above? Perhaps
prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in the Eighteenth
Judicial District simply because defendants in that district were more
likely to kill multiple victims. To answer the question, we used logistic
regression to examine the relationship between judicial district and the
decision to seek death both before and after controlling for the heinousness of the murders, what we call the reduced model and the full model.77
If the higher concentration of especially heinous murders explains the
geographical disparity, then the disproportional use of the death penalty
in the Eighteenth Judicial District will subside substantially and become
statistically non-significant in the full model; in short, the effect will disappear when the heinousness of the crime is taken into account. Table 2:
Model 1A demonstrates that the odds of the prosecutor seeking death are
4.1 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest of the
state before controlling for the heinousness of the murders.78 Table 2:
Model 1B demonstrates that the odds of the prosecutor seeking death are
3.7 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest of the
state after controlling for the heinousness of the murders.79 Thus, when
the heinousness of the crime is taken into account the odds ratio does
drop slightly but remains large and statistically significant—the geography effect does not disappear. The fact that prosecutors were more likely
to seek the death penalty in the Eighteenth Judicial District simply cannot be explained away by the fact that more heinous murders occurred in
the Eighteenth Judicial District than occurred elsewhere.

77. Logistic regression is the appropriate multivariate statistical model because the dependent
variable is dichotomous: whether or not the prosecutor sought death.
78. The odds ratio is the odds for one group relative to the odds for another group. Odds are
calculated as follows: the number of times an event did occur divided by the number of times an
event did not occur (the number of times the prosecutor did seek death divided by the number of
times the prosecutor did not seek death). The odds for defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District
are 7/53 (.132075). The odds for defendants across the rest of the state are 15/471 (.031847). Thus,
the odds ratio is 4.1 (.132075/.031847). The odds ratio is interpreted as follows: the odds of a prosecutor seeking the death penalty are 4.1 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest
of the state before controlling for the heinousness of the murders. The relationship is statistically
significant at p < .01. After controlling for the heinousness of the murders, the logistic regression
model adjusts the odds ratio for the Eighteenth Judicial District upward (the true geographical disparity is larger than the original estimate) or downward (the true geographical disparity is smaller
than the original estimate). An odds ratio of one denotes no relationship (the odds of the event happening are the same for both groups). Here, the odds ratio is adjusted downward, because the true
geographical disparity is slightly smaller than the original estimate. Nevertheless, the odds ratio
remains large and statistically significant. The authors have the logistic regression model on file and
are willing to share it with future researchers upon request.
79. The relationship is statistically significant at p ≤ .01.
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Table 2. Odds Ratios from the Logistic Regression of Seek Death on Place and Race (n = 546)
Model
Model
Model
Model

18th JD
Minority Defendant

1A
(R)

1B
(F)

4.1***

3.7***

2A
(R)

2B
(F)

5.5**

5.8**

3

4A
(R)

4B
(F)

17.6***

18.1***

4.0*

4.2*

3.6***

Minority Defendant in
18th JD
Minority Defendant Outside 18th JD
Heinousness (Multiple
2.9**
3.4***
Victims)
P values: * p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests)

5.7**

3.2**

3.4**

We use the same approach to determine whether the impact of race
holds up after controlling for the heinousness of the murders. It is certainly possible that minority defendants are more likely to be prosecuted
in capital cases because they commit more aggravated homicides than do
white defendants. But the facts belie this theory: 13% of minority defendants killed multiple victims compared to 14% of white defendants
(this is not statistically significant). In other words, minority group members in our study were actually less likely to kill multiple victims than
were whites. Thus, controlling for the heinousness of the murders in a
logistic regression model will necessarily increase—not decrease—the
impact of race on case selection; prosecutors were substantially more
likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants despite the
fact that such defendants were slightly less likely to commit the worst
murders. Table 2: Models 2A and 2B, illustrates the point: the odds ratio
for minority defendant increases from 5.5 in the reduced model to 5.8 in
the full model.80 So the odds of a prosecutor seeking death are 5.8 times
higher against minority defendants than against white defendants after
taking the heinousness of the murders into account.
Model 3 confirms that the findings remain unchanged if all the predictors—race, geography, and heinousness—are included in the model
simultaneously (the impact of race remains statistically significant after
controlling for both place and heinousness; the impact of place remains
statistically significant after controlling for both race and heinousness).
Finally, we extend the analysis to consider the interplay of race and
place. The combined influence, evinced in Models 4A and 4B, is potent:
even after controlling for the heinousness of the murders, the odds of the
prosecution seeking death against a minority defendant are 4.2 times

80.

Both odds ratios are statistically significant at p ≤ .05.
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higher outside the Eighteenth Judicial District and 18.1 times higher
within it, compared to white defendants statewide.81
We now have an answer to the question that drove our analysis: Do
prosecutorial decisions to seek death have a disproportionate impact on
defendants of particular races and in certain geographic locations? The
results are unequivocal. During the time period under consideration,
among statutorily death eligible defendants, prosecutors statewide were
more likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants than
against white defendants. Moreover, prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to seek the death penalty than were prosecutors elsewhere. Finally, the intersection of race and place is particularly fateful—remarkably, statutorily death-eligible minority defendants in
the Eighteenth Judicial District were fourteen times more likely to face a
death prosecution than their white counterparts statewide (15.9% versus
1.1%). Moreover, we have shown that these differences cannot be explained by differences in the number or seriousness of the killings committed by minorities. Race and place are statistically significant predictors of whether the death penalty will be sought Colorado.
CONCLUSION
In Colorado, it is “exceedingly rare”82 for a prosecutor to seek death
or for a condemned prisoner to be executed. The contraction in the use of
the death penalty has been steady for over three decades, ever since the
return of the death penalty to Colorado in 1979. Indeed, there has been
only one execution in the state since the 1960s. As was noted in the Colorado Narrowing Study, the very rarity of the death penalty is cause for
concern; a jurisdiction in which very few of the defendants statutorily
eligible for the death penalty actually receive that penalty is constitutionally suspect for that reason alone. Colorado imposes the death penalty on
fewer of its death-eligible defendants than any other state that has been

81. The former odds ratio is statistically significant at p ≤ .10 and the latter is statistically
significant at p ≤ .01. We created additional logistic regression models to ensure that the substantive
findings were robust. Specifically, we controlled for the presence of a female victim and the presence of a child victim, and changed the measure of heinousness from whether the defendant killed
multiple victims (a dichotomous indicator) to a count of the number of victims. Statewide, of the
seventy-three defendants who killed multiple victims, sixty-one killed two victims, ten killed three
victims, and two killed four victims. The findings for place, race, and the interaction of place and
race were the same regardless of model specification. Thus, we present the most parsimonious
models (doing so is particularly important because of limited variation in the dependent variable;
death was only sought against 22 of the 546 death-eligible defendants). The additional models are
available upon request.
82. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (considering the extreme rarity of a penalty
when determining whether that penalty has become unconstitutional). In Graham, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon a juvenile offender who did not murder violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 82. The Court relied in part upon Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which it had
abolished the death penalty for persons with intellectual disability based in part upon the rarity of
that practice. Id. at 65.
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investigated.83 Many Colorado killers are eligible for the death penalty—
Colorado has an extraordinarily broad first-degree murder statute and
over 90% of first-degree murderers are statutorily eligible for the death
penalty84—but an increasingly small number of them face that ultimate
punishment.
Colorado’s system is thus based on a capital statute that vests extraordinary discretion in the hands of prosecutors. We now know that this
essentially unfettered discretion has been exercised in ways that should
trouble anyone interested in the even-handed application of justice. We
have demonstrated that the location of a murder and the color of the killer’s skin have far more to do with whether the death penalty is sought
than whether a defendant’s crime is among the worst of the worst, as
measured by examining whether the defendant has killed multiple victims.
One understandable reaction to the data reported in this study might
be to suggest that prosecutors should target more white men or women
for death penalty prosecutions or that prosecutors outside the Eighteenth
Judicial District should seek death more often. In that way, the reasoning
goes, the administration of the death penalty would be rendered slightly
less unfair. But, of course, this would miss the point and would constitute
the very targeting and arbitrariness that any system of justice should abhor. Defendants should be selected for death based on desert, not according to a quota system that operates on the basis of race, geography, or
any other factor extraneous to the defendant’s moral culpability.
It is true that implicit bias is everywhere—in our hiring decisions,
our social relationships, and throughout our criminal justice system. We
need a criminal justice system, of course, and we have no choice but to
tolerate some discrimination there even as we work to minimize it. But
such discrimination in the exercise of a capital sentencing regime is significantly more problematic. This Article demonstrates that, in addition
to being used infrequently, the death penalty is being applied disproportionately against certain groups in ways that have nothing to do with the
seriousness of the offense. This infrequency, and the penalty’s arbitrary
application across racial and geographic lines compel the conclusion that
the death penalty in Colorado is not constitutionally tolerable.

83.
84.

See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 1015.
Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1110.
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APPENDIX I. DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS, CASES FILED JANUARY 1,
1999 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 201085
No.

County

Case Number

Defendant

Denver
Denver
El Paso
Denver
Denver
Teller
Adams
Adams
Adams
Morgan
Adams
Arapahoe

Judicial
District
2
2
4
2
2
4
17
17
17
13
17
18

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

1999CR189
1999CR2325
1999CR3818
1999CR2029
1999CR2738
2000CR178
2000CR1675
2000CR634
2000CR638
2000CR200
2000CR1491
2001CR1744

Omar Ramirez
Cong Than
Anthony Albert
Donta Paige
Abraham Hagos
Anthony Jimenez
Manuel Melina
John Sweeney
Jesse Wilkinson
Cruz Palomo
Leandro Lopez
Edward Brown

13

Lincoln*

18

2002CR95

Edward Montour

14
15
16
17

Adams
Weld
Rio Grande
Lincoln

17
19
12
18

2002CR2231
2002CR457
2005CR65
2005CR73

Jimmy Vasquez
Allen Bergerud
Michael Medina
David Bueno

18
19
20
21
22

Lincoln*
18
El Paso
4
Douglas
18
Arapahoe
18
Arapahoe
18
*Venue was changed to
was commenced.

Defendant
Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic
Asian
Black
Black
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
Black

Gender of
Victim
F, M
F, M
M
F
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
M

Hispanic/Native
American
Hispanic
White
Hispanic
Hispanic

M

2005CR74
Alejandro Perez
Hispanic
2006CR5870
Marco Lee
Black
2006CR636
Jose Rubi-Nava
Hispanic
2006CR705
Sir Mario Owens
Black
2006CR697
Robert Ray
Black
a different county for trial. This is the venue in which the

F
F, M
child
M
M
M
F
F, M
F, M
case

85. The following five death prosecutions were commenced after 2010, and as such were beyond the
scope of the Colorado Narrowing Study. They are included here only for thoroughness. As of this
writing, there are two ongoing death penalty trials in Colorado: In Denver County, a black man
(Dexter Lewis) is charged with killing five women and one man (Denver Cnty., No. 2012CR4743),
and in Arapahoe County, a white man (James Holmes) has been convicted of killing twelve men and
women (Arapahoe Cnty, No. 2012CR1522). In 2015, two white defendants (Cassandra Rieb (female) and Brendan Johnson (male)) in Logan County pleaded guilty for the killing of Johnson’s
grandparents (Logan Cnty., Nos. 2014CR98, 2014CR99), and in 2012, a white man (Josiah Sher)
pleaded guilty in a double homicide in Douglas County that left one man and one woman dead
(Douglas Cnty., No. 2011CR106).

